Recently, democracies have experienced a flourishing of interest in citizendeliberation, and scholars have begun to investigate the deliberative practices thathave thereby emerged. Citizen deliberation endeavors to place citizens in specialpolitical discussions involving a collective search for agreement based on goodargument. One of the most notable examples is the "Deliberative Poll"; (Fishkin1995, Fishkin and Luskin 1999). Other research on citizen deliberation examines
a variety of practices, including Chicago Local School Councils (Fung 2003,
Macedo 2005), citizen juries (Crosby 1995, Smith and Wales 2000), "town" meetings and race deliberation (Mendelberg and Oleske 2000, Polletta and Wood2003, Quell 1998), deliberative forums, conventions, and organizations (Barabas2004, Button and Mattson 1999, Gastil 2000, Ryfe 2002), and policy analysis(Pelletier et al. 1999). This rise of deliberative practices immediately followedthe emergence of deliberative democratic theory on the forefront of democratictheory. In his recent book, a leading political theorist, John S. Dryzek, writes that democratic theory has taken a strong deliberative turn. (2002, 1). The burgeoning literature on deliberative democratic theory illustrates this deliberativeturn (see, for example, Benhabib 1996; Bessette 1994; Chambers 1996; Cohen1989; Dryzek 1990; Fishkin 1995; Fraser 1992; Gutmann and Thompson 1996;
Habermas 1981, 1989; Rawls 1993; Young 1996).

An important impetus behind the growing interest in citizen deliberation has been the claim that immersing citizens in deliberative contexts can help educate them about political issues, countering the low levels of political knowledge and sophistication in the mass public (Fishkin 1995). Much research indicates that the mass public is uniformed, misinformed, and neither veryknowledgeable nor sophisticated about politics (Converse 1964, Delli Carpini andKeeter 1996, Kuklinski et al. 2000). Low levels of knowledge need to be addressed because knowledge matters. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) find thatgeneral political knowledge, measured as a series of factual items, has positiveand significant effects on political tolerance, electoral participation, and whethercitizens hold opinions in the first place. Similarly, Feldman (1989) and Eriksonand Knight (1993) have found that in panel studies, political knowledgesignificantly influences response variability, suggesting that those with greaterknowledge are less likely to hold "nonattitudes" (Converse 1964). Given the
value of political knowledge and low levels of knowledge among much of the public, inequality becomes an important concern. Delli Carpini and Keeter(1996) find that political knowledge tends to be quite inequitably distributed across socioeconomic status. They conclude that, "…the maldistribution of political knowledge…threatens the basic democratic principle of political equalityamong citizens" (265).

Even if deliberation can enhance citizens' political knowledge andsophistication, it also faces important equality concerns. The knowledge benefitsof deliberation might accrue inequitably, much as in traditional politicalparticipation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Verba et al. 1995). Of course deliberative democratic theorists recognize this problem. Yet, although someadvocate for economic and institutional reforms to accompany the expansion ofdeliberative practices (e.g., Benhabib 1996, Young 1996), deliberative practiceshave expanded absent such reforms. In addition, inequality presents a challengebecause deliberation would ideally proceed with all citizens equally able torepresent their viewpoints (Sanders 1997, 349).

The following questions guide this paper: (1) Can citizens' involvement in deliberative contexts improve their knowledge of political decisions? (2) If it does, what aspect of these contexts leads to learning—discussion, informative readings, or both? (3) What implications does the mechanism of learning have for the design of deliberative contexts? (4) What factors enhance or hinder learning in deliberative contexts? (5) What do these factors indicate about the degree of learning inequality in deliberative contexts? (6) Do these factors suggest interventions to reduce learning inequality?

(1) Research on deliberation has found that people who participate indeliberative contexts do learn. However, this research has not adequatelydetermined what aspects of these contexts lead to learning. Knowledge of theexact mechanism of learning in deliberative contexts is crucial to determine howbest to design these contexts to foster learning. In addition, prior research has notcarefully examined the individual-level factors that can affect deliberativelearning. Knowledge of these factors may help address concerns about possible inequitable results of deliberation. This paper introduces a theory of political agency that suggests factors for explaining learning in deliberative contexts, including political reflectiveness and conceptions of citizen identity. The paper tests a statistical model, involving these agency variables, demographic factors, and experimental conditions—including discussion and information-only conditions. The model is tested with data from pre- and post-test surveys of are representative sample of 568 Pittsburgh residents who came to a one-day deliberation experiment. We find no evidence that post-discussion knowledge grew more with discussion than with readings and contemplation. The paper discusses deliberative design implications. We also find that socioeconomic factors do predict inequality in learning, but are partly counteracted by agency. The agency variables suggest points of intervention to mitigate inequality. Agency theory may prove valuable for deliberation research more generally.

DELIBERATIVE LEARNING

According to theorists, deliberation approximates an ideal speech environment(Habermas 1989) whereby one of the main procedural conditions is the cooperative search for agreement. Deliberation changes opinions because participants give each other persuasive reasons (see Chambers 1996). As participants learn each other's reasons, they should themselves become better at providing reasons and recognizing the reasons of others. Even if participants in a deliberation do not actually change their opinions, most deliberative theorists would agree they should gain knowledge. Young (1996, 128, cited in Barabas2004, 688) says that deliberation, "…adds to the social knowledge of all the participants." Gutmann and Thompson (1996) write, "The moral promise of deliberative democracy depends on the political learning that reiterated deliberation makes possible."

Recent research has provided consistent evidence for an increase in participants' knowledge and sophistication during deliberative experiences, but this research does not clarify the exact source of these improvements. Most of these studies were not suited to untangling the effects of deliberative discussion from the effects of information acquired through reading materials and other sources. In studies by Barabas (2004), Gastil and Dillard (1999), and Luskin et al.
(2002), participants were, respectively, administered pre-tests, provided with reading materials, engaged in deliberation, and administered post-tests. Participants in the renowned Deliberative Poll™ receive policy briefings by experts as well as readings (Luskin et al. 2002). Given research designs with information and discussion sandwiched between pre- and post-tests, it is impossible to determine whether learning occurred because of discussion, because of reading materials or other information exposure, or some combination of these factors.

Price and Cappella's (2002) Electronic Dialogue Project, in which participants spent months discussing election-related issues in the 2000 Presidential run, constitutes an experimental study that could determine whether discussions increased knowledge. Participants in the discussion condition could be rigorously compared with control group members who could not participate in these discussions. We are unaware of any published findings from this study that employed the experimental findings to determine whether discussion led to knowledge gains. One paper from the project (Price, Cappella, and Nir 2002) shows that those who discuss more frequently and with people who disagree with them are also able to generate more extended argument repertoires—that is, they are better able to recall pro and con arguments regarding a policy. This finding was not about discussions in the experiment but from surveys in which people were asked about their everyday discussion habits with acquaintances, family, and friends. While suggestive, these results face certain limitations. They do not establish direction of causality—greater argument repertoire might have led people to more discussions. This is especially plausible in light of another
finding—those with greater political knowledge and interest were more likely to come to the experimental discussions (Price and Cappella 2002). Also, argument repertoire is a recall measure that may be an imperfect indicator of political knowledge. As for factual knowledge gains, an overview of study findings (Price and Cappella 2002) states there were few "large" knowledge gains and reports on significant gains exclusively on one knowledge item. It is unclear whether these reports concerned the knowledge gains due to experimental discussions or correlated with self-reports of everyday discussions.

A study of an Australian citizens jury found jurors' [substantive] opinions changed in the information rather than in the discussion phase of the jury proceedings (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003). Questionnaires indicated knowledge gains after the 12 jurors received background briefings and questioned experts, but not after the subsequent discussion. The sample size was very small, so these changes were not statistically reliable. But perhaps information alone could provoke what Goodin (2005) calls an "internal reflective deliberation" that enhances knowledge.

More rigorous studies that separate the effects of informative readings from discussion can successfully demonstrate the value of deliberative discussion. Morrell (2005), for example, shows that internal political efficacy rises in response to discussion, not readings. This research compared people who read information with those who both read information and participated in discussion.

Overall, while the empirical literature on deliberation has built a case for learning in deliberative contexts, the findings have been unclear about the mechanism—discussion or information sources. Establishing a mechanism has important implications for inequality as well. If the "informative readings" matter most, this finding could suggest reforms that will more equitably distribute political knowledge. Also important for addressing inequality is a better understanding of what individual-level factors contribute to this inequality. We next motivate and sketch a theory of human agency that suggests factors that help explain inequality. The theory may prove to be a beneficial framework for deliberation research more broadly.